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Abstract
The final provisions of the UK’s Companies Act 2006 have now been in force for 
10 years. Part of this regime included a new form of model constitution, known as 
the Model Articles. This article uses empirical data to establish whether the Model 
Articles have been used in practice or not. To do so, it tracks the constitutions of a 
sample of companies (those incorporated in Scotland in October 2009) from their 
incorporation until December 2017. It undertakes a leximetric methodology to code 
12 variables across the constitutions, with a 0 being coded for convergence to the 
default regime and 1 being coded for divergence from the default regime. The results 
show that the majority of companies do not deviate from the default regime, other 
than in one respect: most allowed for the ability to appoint alternate directors. More 
importantly, however, the dataset shows that few of the sample companies amended 
their articles of association following incorporation, and that there is a strong cor-
relation between certain coding patterns and the presenter, or formation agent, used 
to incorporate the company.
Keywords Company law · Corporate law · Leximetrics · Empirical methodology
1 Introduction
It has now been 10 years since the final provisions of the UK Companies Act 2006 
were brought into force.1 One of the provisions that was introduced was a new sys-
tem for incorporating companies.2 The new system was incredibly similar to the old 
 * Jonathan Hardman 
 Jonathan.hardman@ed.ac.uk
1 Lecturer in International Commercial Law, University of Edinburgh (School of Law), 
Edinburgh, UK
1 The final transitional provisions, Companies Act 2006 (Commencement No. 8, Transitional Provisions 
and Savings) Order 2008 (SI 2008/2860), became effective on 1 October 2009. See Hardman (2020a).
2 Companies Act 2006, s. 9 replaced Companies Act 1985, s. 10 and Sch. 1.
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system. In particular, UK company law left a large amount of corporate law con-
tained in the constitution of the company rather than in statute,3 with the articles 
of association the key constitutional document.4 This voluntary approach has often 
proved controversial.5 To assist those who cannot or do not want to incur the cost 
of drafting a bespoke constitution the UK government lays out default rules which 
apply in the absence of contrary agreement.6 Prior to the implementation of the 
Companies Act 2006 these default articles were known in the UK as ‘Table A’,7 and 
since the implementation are now the ‘Model Articles’.8 Thus the Model Articles 
provide the default regime for company constitutions in the UK for all companies 
incorporated since 1 October 2009. The UK adopts a slightly unusual approach, in 
that should a company elect to apply the default rules, any change in the default 
rules will not result in any change to such company’s articles of association: such 
an election only applies the articles of association as at the date of incorporation, 
not from time to time.9 There has only been one minor change to the Model Articles 
since their introduction,10 but the content of the Model Articles varied greatly from 
that in Table A.11 Accordingly, the change on 1 October 2009 from Table A for new 
companies to the Model Articles represented somewhat of a break in continuity for 
UK company law. This article explores how the market has re-acted to the introduc-
tion of the Model Articles.
This article focuses on private companies. There are a number of reasons to do 
so. Firstly, a company is a private company by default in the UK.12 This makes them 
the core company entity within the UK corporate law framework. This is reflected 
by the number of legal vehicles—as at 2015, while there were in excess of three 
million companies on the UK companies register, only around 7,500 were public 
companies, with the vast majority being private.13 Secondly, private companies play 
a key role in UK business. It is sometimes stated that private companies are, as a 
rule, associated with smaller companies while public companies are seen to denote 
6 Companies Act 2006, s. 20.
7 Companies Act 1985, s. 8.
8 Companies Act 2006, s. 19; The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229). There 
are, actually, three sets of Model Articles: for private companies limited by share (Schedule 1), for pri-
vate companies limited by guarantee (Schedule 2) and for public companies (Schedule 3). In line with 
the approach taken generally in this article, we shall only look to the first of these three, and shall refer to 
those listed in Schedule 1 (and only them) as the Model Articles throughout this article. Any reference to 
a ‘Model Article’ is a reference to the corresponding article of Schedule 1 of these regulations.
9 Riley (2010).
10 Minor changes were enacted to omit removal of directors on mental health grounds by the Mental 
Health (Discrimination) Act 2013, s. 3.
11 See Department for Business Innovation and Skills (2011) for a full discussion of the differences 
between Table A and the Model Articles.
12 Companies Act 2006, s. 4(2).
13 Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 1–23.
3 For example, see Chiu (2009), p 697; Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 3–13; Omar (2009).
4 Companies Act 2006, ss. 17–18.
5 For example, see the critique of leaving the division of powers between shareholders and directors to 
the company’s constitution in Watson (2011).
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larger companies.14 However, many larger UK companies are structured as private 
companies,15 and private companies are used structurally in several industries, most 
notably in private equity.16 Private companies are, therefore, important commercial 
vehicles in their own right, in addition to being the first step towards having a pub-
lic company. Thirdly, while considerable research has been undertaken into public 
companies,17 private companies remain under-analysed and they are therefore ripe 
for study. This means that a study of private companies fills an important gap in cor-
porate law literature.
The purpose of this article is, therefore, to explore these Model Articles for pri-
vate companies within the UK. To do so, it firstly establishes what the Model Arti-
cles were meant to achieve in terms of default rule literature. It identifies that the 
Model Articles were intended to be a ‘majoritarian default’, that is reflecting the 
norms that the majority of market participants would have picked were they to do 
have done so. It then moves to explore whether this is the case: are market partici-
pants in the UK actually using the Model Articles in practice or not? To test this, it 
adopts a leximetric methodology18 to code the articles of association of a sample of 
companies incorporated since the Model Articles replaced Table A. This methodol-
ogy has been historically used to judge whether laws are friendly towards a certain 
group or not, including over time, and more recently to establish compliance with 
law. This article is the first article to apply this methodology to convergence between 
market activity and default rules. It is also the first to holistically review a sample of 
articles of association under the new regime to establish whether the Model Articles 
are, ultimately, correct. It is therefore novel in both its methodology and the subject 
matter of its study. Each of these have important implications: the former means that 
this methodology can be exported to establish whether other default rules, across a 
myriad of subjects, are actually used or not—a new method of examining the con-
tent of default rules; the latter enables us to explore the previously-ignored subject 
of whether the statutory default rules are followed in practice or not.
The results of this novel methodology show that the majority of variables are 
not frequently deviated from. 11 of the 12 variables selected show high levels of 
convergence to the default rules. However, the majority of companies did provide 
14 For example, see Cosh and Hughes (1994), p 18.
15 For example, see Ferran (2019), pp 527–528.
16 Berry (2019).
17 For example, Kraakman et al. (2017), ch. 8 (Control Transactions) relates exclusively to control trans-
actions in listed companies. Similarly, in Berle and Means (1967), the modern theory that company law 
exists to deal with the separation of ownership and control arose in the context of US listed companies. 
Bainbridge (2008), p 12 acknowledges that his ‘director primacy’ theory is effectively a theory for public 
companies only.
18 Cooter and Ginsburg (2003).
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for the ability for private companies to appoint alternate directors, which the Model 
Articles do not provide. Further study of the patterns of divergence, however, reveal 
two additional factors: firstly, it was unusual for companies to change their articles 
of association. Secondly, the presenter who presented the company for registra-
tion19 seems to be a driving factor for combination of convergence or divergence 
from the default rules. This may tell us that more attention should be paid to pre-
senters of companies: at the moment, the UK government suggests to those wish-
ing to form companies that they may wish to use a presenter, and provides a list of 
those it understands are active in the presenter market.20 However, if presenters are 
a key driving factor in the articles of association of the company, and market par-
ticipants are not varying their articles of association post-incorporation, then it may 
be that presenters are more important in the corporate governance regime than are 
acknowledged.
There are limits to what this study can conclusively prove. In particular, ques-
tions can be raised as to the sample selection, variable selection, the coding of those 
variables, and the meaning of the analysis. These questions can, however, all be 
answered to a sufficient degree to highlight some importance to the substantial out-
come of this study in addition to the methodological developments. The methodol-
ogy also has considerable potential for further expansion and study.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews default rule theory and applies 
it to the articles of association in the UK. Section 3 outlines the methodology uti-
lised in this paper, including the leximetric approach, sample selection, and cod-
ing selection. Section 4 outlines the results of the application of this methodology 
to publicly available documents. Section 5 discusses the implications of the results, 
explores potential critiques of the approaches taken in this article, and discusses 
potential for further study. Section 6 concludes.
2  Articles of Association and Default Rules
2.1  Importance of Articles of Association
A UK company’s core constitutional document is its articles of association.21 
It has been stated that ‘a remarkable feature of British company law is the extent 
to which it leaves regulation of the internal affairs of a company to the company 
itself through rules laid down in its constitution, in particular in its articles of asso-
ciation’.22 This includes the balance of powers between the board of directors and 
shareholders,23 which has been described by the New Zealand Law Commission as 
20 See https:// www. gov. uk/ gover nment/ publi catio ns/ forma tion- and- compa ny- secre tarial- agents/ compa 
ny- forma tion- agents- and- secre tarial- agents.
21 Companies Act 2006, s. 17(a).
22 Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 3–13.
23 Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co v. Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 CA; Shaw & Sons (Sal-
ford) Ltd v. Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113. For criticism of this approach, see Watson (2011).
19 A presenter is a third party who is paid by those wishing to incorporate their company to assist with 
the incorporation process. See Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 4–32.
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‘entirely unsatisfactory’ and ‘an anachronism which is misleading’.24 Regardless of 
the criticisms of the approach, the UK has left a large amount of corporate law to be 
decided in each company’s constitution since 1856.25 When adopting the Compa-
nies Act 2006, the UK government decided not to ‘change the principle’26 of mat-
ters left to constitutions, and such constitutions being default rules. In doing so, it 
tried to maintain the policy objective of ‘thinking small first’, by keeping the Model 
Articles as ‘simple as possible’ to meet the ‘needs of small, owner-managed busi-
nesses’.27 The rationale for this was that they should ‘focus on the requirements of 
the small businesses which make up the majority of this class of company, rather 
than the minority of such companies whose needs are more complex’.28 Articles of 
association, therefore, remain able to be chosen by shareholders on incorporation,29 
or amended thereafter.30 If bespoke articles of association are not chosen, then the 
Model Articles will apply.31 This makes the Model Articles default rules.
A large number of companies use formation agents in respect of their formation, 
also known as presenters.32 Davies and Worthington have stated of these presenters 
that:
the promoters must determine the extent to which the appropriate model 
is ousted or adopted (whether explicitly or by default). Company formation 
agents normally have their own standard forms, which formally exclude the 
model altogether, though these standard forms are themselves typically devel-
oped from the statutory model and its predecessors. The other extreme, the 
option of not registering any articles and relying on the mode, is rarely chosen 
because most companies wish to define their own rules.33
As the Model Articles apply unless market participants choose otherwise, they are 
opt-out, or default, rules. Considerable literature has been dedicated to default rules. 
Some scholars have debated whether they are of relevance at all. This is based on 
the Coase Theorem, that in the absence of transaction costs, default rules are irrel-
evant and an efficient outcome will arise anyway.34 This can be divided into a ‘hard’ 
version of the theorem, that parties will reach a Pareto Optimal35 outcome regardless 
of default rules, and a ‘soft’ version of the theorem, that the default rules in question 
24 New Zealand Law Commission (1989), paras. 155–156.
25 Watson (2011), pp 605–606.
26 Department for Trade and Industry (2007), para. 3.14.
27 Department for Trade and Industry (2007), para. 3.26.
28 Department for Trade and Industry (2007), para. 3.27.
29 Companies Act 2006, s. 18(2).
30 Companies Act 2006, s. 21.
31 Companies Act 2006, s. 20(1).
32 See the list of company formation agents proposed by the Government at https:// www. gov. uk/ gover 
nment/ publi catio ns/ forma tion- and- compa ny- secre tarial- agents/ compa ny- forma tion- agents- and- secre 
tarial- agents.
33 Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 4–32.
34 Coase (1960); Schwab (1989).
35 That is to say, an outcome from which no party can be made better off without making another party 
worse off. See Feldman (1998).
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do not affect the efficiency of the outcome that would have been achieved.36 Each 
version is predicated on the idea that default rules do not matter because in a totally 
frictionless market, the parties will bargain away any default legal allocation of risk 
between them. However, even when initially raising the principle, Coase claimed 
that a world without transaction costs was unrealistic.37 It could be said that a world 
without transaction costs would provide unintended and unexpected consequences 
to all transactions.38 Transaction costs are usually quite high in any given scenario,39 
and so the world of the Coase Theorem does not exist. Indeed, Coase’s initial analy-
sis has been adapted in ways which Coase did not intend—he wanted to flag the 
importance of transaction costs rather than minimise their role.40
There is a corollary of the Coase Theorem: that in a world with transaction costs 
(i.e. the real world), legal allocation of risk by default rules affects the efficiency of 
the ultimate bargains struck between the parties.41 Indeed, knowledge of the content 
of the underlying default rules itself is, ultimately, a transaction cost that will feed 
into this analysis.42 As a result, we can say that default rules are of importance to 
bargains struck, and therefore should be ‘correct’. The question then becomes how 
to pick correct default rules. It is commonly stated that default rules should ‘mimic 
the market’ and produce laws that those in the market would have made on the 
grounds that these are the most efficient.43 This is known as a ‘majoritarian default’. 
The logic is that a majoritarian default (in the context of a contractual term) will be:
the meaning that most parties to […] contracts would use, which will often 
be the same as the customary meaning or trade usage. If parties expect that 
courts will apply a majoritarian default when disputes arise over the mean-
ing of the contract, they will know that most of the time the court will choose 
the term that maximizes the probability of efficient trade. Accordingly, they 
would be more willing to enter a contract in the first place, despite high trans-
action costs, than they would under an alternative rule. Choosing a majoritar-
ian default rule reduces the negative consequences of high transaction costs.44
The advantage of a majoritarian default rule is therefore that it would reflect what 
the market considers to be the appropriate default rule. However, this approach is not 
universally popular. In situations whereby one party is aware as to a market standard 
position and the other is not, a majoritarian default rule provides the informed party 
with no incentive to inform the other party of the true meaning, which may in turn 
lead to inefficient results. Accordingly, rather than a majoritarian default rule, it is 
argued that sometimes the law should seek to apply a ‘penalty default’, being a rule 
37 Coase (1960), pp 15–19.
38 See Hsiung (1999).
39 See Ellickson (1991).
40 See Schlag (2013).
41 See Demetz (1972), p 26.
42 Ellickson (1989), p 615.
43 For a leading proponent, see Posner (2014), para. 3.5.
44 See Posner (2003), p 839.
36 Schwab (1988).
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that regular market contractors would not have used.45 This logic has been described 
as:
This strategy, which would give parties an incentive to write a less ambiguous 
contract than they might otherwise, has two motivations. First, it discourages 
parties from externalizing the cost of interpreting the contract on the courts. 
If parties were clearer, courts would have less work to do. Second, it discour-
ages parties from opportunistically concealing information from each other. If 
one party knows about the ambiguity of the word ‘chicken’ and prefers the 
majoritarian meaning, and the other party does not know about the ambiguity, 
then the first party would have no incentive to disclose the ambiguity to the 
second, unless a penalty default rule held the informed party to the less favour-
able meaning.46
There is, however, a structural difficulty with penalty rules. An informed party 
may, even then, decide to proceed with the penalty rather than provide information 
to the other party which may result in that other party push for a better outcome to 
a transaction.47 This applies even when the party with the information and the party 
without are on the same ‘side’ of the transaction.48 Supporters of penalty default 
rules are keen to emphasise that such strategic positioning does not undermine the 
value of penalty defaults where information asymmetries between the parties are 
particularly high.49 However, their utility in other situations is likely to be limited: it 
is a question of fact as to whether any given default rule should be a ‘majoritarian’ 
or ‘penalty’ default rule.50
In establishing how to set the content of the Model Articles, the UK govern-
ment chose to design them ‘with the needs of small, owner-managed businesses in 
mind’.51 Further, they acknowledged that most companies by number are small, and 
should only need simple articles—but where needs are more complex, then they are 
also likely to be more bespoke.52 Accordingly, the UK government made certain 
assumptions about the needs of the majority of companies and set the Model Arti-
cles to meet those assumptions. This would appear to be clear majoritarian default—
the UK government aimed to pick rules that suited the needs of the majority of 
companies, and therefore that the majority of companies would apply, to save the 
majority of companies from needing to negotiate their own constitutions. There is 
certainly no hint of penalty default rhetoric.
But have the UK government picked these correctly? Are market participants 
actually using the Model Articles, or are they diverging from them? Qualitative 
51 Department of Trade and Industry (2007), para. 3.26.
52 Department of Trade and Industry (2007), para. 3.27.
45 See Ayres and Gertner (1989).
46 Posner (2003), p 839.
47 See Johnston (1990); Ayres and Gertner (1991).
48 Adler (1999).
49 Ayres and Gertner (1999).
50 Posner (2003), p 841.
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empirical studies of constitutions of UK companies have been undertaken, most 
notably of constitutions of companies prior to 1850.53 We can build on this by pro-
viding a quantitative empirical studies of articles of association of companies incor-
porated in the UK under the Companies Act 2006. We will synthesise large amounts 
of data by adopting a leximetric approach to analysing articles of association.
3  Methodology
3.1  Methodological Approach
The rest of this article empirically examines whether participants are adopting the 
Model Articles as the articles of association for private companies, as a way to eval-
uate whether the Model Articles achieve the UK government’s aims by representing 
a majoritarian default approach. We achieve this by exploring whether the majority 
of companies are, in fact, using the Model Articles. To do so, we adopt a quanti-
tative, or leximetric, methodology. The term ‘leximetrics’ was coined in 2003 by 
Cooter and Ginsburg54 to describe a quantitative analytical style that developed in 
the late 1990s. Leximetrics is a ‘quantitative form of empirical methodology’.55 Lele 
and Siems state that: ‘“Leximetrics” can be understood as every quantitative meas-
urement of law’.56 The pioneers of this approach were La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny, who in two articles in the late 1990s began the methodologi-
cal school.57 La Porta and others applied scores to laws within various jurisdictions. 
When comparing these to various financial metrics applicable to that jurisdiction, 
they were able to draw lines of correlation between aggregate scores for certain legal 
norms and financial metrics. They therefore selected a series of variables in legal 
norms and applied coding to allow them to establish correlations between different 
scores and financial metrics. It is important to note that such correlation does not 
imply causation.58
The approach of La Porta and others, ‘has been and is still cited frequently and 
usually uncritically, in legal as well as economic journals’.59 Two key strands of crit-
icism emerge: those of variable selection; and those of coding. On the selection of 
variables, Lele and Siems have stated:
[T]he selection of variables must be intelligible and wide enough to function 
as a proxy for shareholder protection in general, which is not the case with 
54 Cooter and Ginsburg (2003).
55 Hardman (2017), p 39.
56 Lele and Siems (2007), p 20.
57 La Porta et al. (1998); La Porta et al. (1997).
58 Fagernäs, Sarkar and Singh (2008), p 21.
59 Braendle (2006), p 260.
53 Freeman et al. (2013).
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La Porta et al’s eight variables. They do not fully capture the most significant 
aspects of the law.60
It is therefore important to select the variables used within a leximetric data set 
correctly, especially when trying to use the data (as La Porta et al did) to make more 
general statements about the legal landscape. Sometimes more variables are required 
in order to provide a more complete understanding of the issue.61 Lele and Siems 
emphasise the importance of ‘functionality’ within variables—that legal rules may 
achieve the same function in ways which appear very different. It is therefore impor-
tant to ensure that variables are tested functionally rather than by formal appear-
ance. There have been issues raised with how La Porta and others coded their scores 
within variables. Spamman has found that re-coded data varies greatly from the offi-
cial La Porta data set.62 Similarly, Cools found that the coding ignored various other 
legal devices to achieve the same ends.63 It is therefore important to ensure that the 
coding is consistently and accurately performed on a functional basis when under-
taking leximetric research.
Leximetrics began as a method by which to analyse different legal approaches to 
shareholder protection and their effects, but has developed considerably. It is widely 
used in comparative law from testing whether corporate laws converge over time,64 
to comparisons of collateral and bankruptcy law,65 to comparing labour law between 
jurisdictions.66 Such studies have also become more sophisticated in their analysis. 
Thus, studies have commenced comparing jurisdictions over time67 and phenomena 
within a single jurisdiction over time.68 This approach shows the flexibility of a lexi-
metric model: rather than a traditional qualitative analysis, any laws can be subject 
to a leximetric, quantitative analysis provided that the variables and the coding are 
correct.
For application to this article, the most important recent development of leximet-
ric methodology occurred in the context of strategic reporting. Esser, MacNeil and 
Chalaczkiewicz applied a leximetric approach to establish whether companies were 
complying with strategic reporting requirements.69 Rather than variables as to ‘law’ 
being coded, variables as to ‘compliance’ were coded. This approach shows that 
leximetrics can be extended beyond coding laws to establish whether market partici-
pants are complying with statutory requirements of non-financial reporting. In other 
words, we can use the leximetric approach to measure what is actually taking place 




64 Siems (2010). It should be noted that more complicated methodologies are also being developed on a 
qualitative comparative basis. See LoPucki (2018).
65 Haslemann, Pistor and Vig (2010).
66 See Adams et al. (2017).
67 Siems (2008a).
68 Anderson et al. (2012).
69 Esser, MacNeil and Chalaczkiewicz (2018).
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in the market. We therefore use a leximetric approach to establish whether market 
participants are diverging from the default position contained in the Model Arti-
cles or not. Other empirical studies have reviewed whether market participants use 
default rules in corporate governance.70 Using leximetric techniques, we therefore 
establish whether market participants conform to the default regime across a number 
of variables, showing that these variables have met the aims of the UK government, 
or diverge from the default regime.
We establish whether market participants are using the Model Articles using pub-
lic filing systems. A company’s constitution, together with any changes to it, must 
be publicly filed.71 There have been recent reforms to the public register which 
increases its utility for empirical research.72 Whilst this register has always been 
publicly searchable, the search methods have been very cumbersome. A searcher 
was able to review data on ‘microfiche’,73 but this was particularly time consuming. 
This prevented the primary gathering of data, but more importantly, prevented the 
verification of any data collected which undermined the value of the quantitative 
research. This data was eventually uploaded online, and was accessible in exchange 
for payment for each document reviewed. On 22 June 2015 information became eas-
ier to access with the launch of a new website which offers a free ‘beta’ search of the 
Companies House data.74 The free data enables easier data gathering and verifica-
tion, however, it does not contain all (especially historical) records of companies, 
and accordingly when faced with the two options the paid service is more reliable. 
Nonetheless, the beta service is especially useful for research, enabling free access 
to data for the primary data gatherer and any subsequent verification of that dataset 
by third parties. This is key to ensuring that the often stark results of leximetric 
analysis are, in fact, accurate.75 Between January 2018 and March 2018 there were 
167,717 companies incorporated in the UK.76 If the rate of incorporation was con-
stant then this implies over 6,000,000 companies have been incorporated since 1 
October 2009. Reviewing all of these articles to establish whether they converge to 
or diverge from the Model Articles is impractical. Accordingly, we selected a sam-
ple of these companies.
71 Companies Act 2006, ss. 9 and 20.
72 See Hardman (2018).
73 Copies of all documents filed before 1 January 2003 were originally stored in this way, but are now 
mostly available for online access. See Howley and Bateman (2007), p 4.
74 See https:// www. gov. uk/ gover nment/ news/ launch- of- the- new- compa nies- house- public- beta- servi ce. 
Since the data used in this article was gathered, Companies House have replaced the ‘beta’ service with 
a fuller and more robust online search system. See https:// find- and- update. compa ny- infor mation. servi ce. 
gov. uk/.
75 See Spamann (2010).
76 See https:// www. gov. uk/ gover nment/ publi catio ns/ incor porat ed- compa nies- in- the- uk- janua ry- to- march 
2018/ incor porat ed- compa nies- in- the- uk- janua ry- to- march- 2018.
70 Lin and Chang (2018).
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3.2  Sample Selection
Of great concern was how to establish our sample. Given the number of companies, 
an holistic review of the entire database was not possible. We therefore needed to 
establish how to delimit the sample taken. One option was to take an entirely random 
sample, however, this would limit the data that arose from the sample: more recent 
companies have been in existence for a shorter period of time, and therefore any data 
received from them would be less helpful to establish whether companies changed 
their articles of association post-incorporation. Accordingly, we wanted the longest 
possible company life in order to track this. As our enquiry is limited to whether the 
UK government had met its aims in picking the Model Articles, we decided to pick 
the earliest set of companies so incorporated. Even within this, however, there were 
too large a number to code. We needed to narrow further. Our options were to take a 
randomised sample of the earliest companies, but this (once again) risked lacking an 
holistic overview of any particular sample group.
To resolve this issue, we narrowed our focus to companies incorporated in Scot-
land for a sample period: all those companies incorporated in Scotland within the 
first month of the new Model Articles regime, being October 2009. Narrowing to 
Scotland over the course of 1 month enabled us to review the entire sample and 
code the article of all companies incorporated within this group, without the need to 
select a section thereof. We use the term ‘Sample’ for this group. As the Companies 
Act 2006’s provisions with regard to UK company incorporation were introduced on 
1 October 2009, the Sample represents the oldest group of companies incorporated 
under this regime in Scotland. It therefore provides us with the longest possible 
period in which to evaluate what market participants have changed from the default 
regime for which specific companies. It also includes all companies registered in 
that jurisdiction within that time period, lowering the risk that any trends within that 
jurisdiction and incorporated at that time are missed. Upon registration, companies 
are each given an eight digit sequential number by UK Companies House which 
remains their unique identifying number.77 This is important as the names of com-
panies can change,78 which may mean that tracking companies becomes difficult in 
the event of name ‘swapping’ between companies or frequent changes. All compa-
nies incorporated in Scotland have a unique six number digit code prefaced by ‘SC’ 
(in contradistinction to companies incorporated in England and Wales which have a 
unique eight number digit code).79 All UK companies also have a date of incorpo-
ration which is publicly available. Accordingly, to identify our sample groups, we 
begin with the lowest six number digit code prefaced by SC incorporated on the first 
date of the sample period, and include all sequentially numbered companies up to 
and including the highest six number digit code prefaced by SC incorporated on the 
last date of the sample period.
77 Companies Act 2006, s. 1066.
78 Companies Act 2006, s. 77.
79 Companies Act 2006, s. 1066(2).
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Companies are incorporated in the UK by filling in the correct form and submit-
ting it to Companies House. The company is formed on the date that Companies 
House processes the form.80 Since 1 October 2009, all UK companies have had to be 
incorporated using a form IN01, which means that the companies are incorporated 
under the 2006 Act regime.81 However, to ease transition from the Companies Act 
1985 regime to the Companies Act 2006 regime, UK Companies House continued 
to process applications submitted under the Companies Act 1985 regime, provided 
that they were received by Companies House (albeit not yet processed) prior to 1 
October 2009.82 Any such applicant is subject to the regime under the Companies 
Act 1985. Accordingly, we excluded any applications which fall under the Compa-
nies Act 1985 regime from our Sample. We are interested in focusing on UK private 
companies, and so we excluded any other form of company from our consideration, 
including entities incorporated as public limited companies,83 private companies 
limited by guarantee,84 or unlimited companies.85 Accordingly, there are some ele-
ments of the Sample which must be excluded from this group before undertaking the 
relevant leximetric analysis.
3.3  Variable Selection and Coding
Having identified our sample group, we next identified our variables. We have seen 
that presenters of a company must tick a box to state whether the Model Articles 
should apply in whole or in part. Whilst this can be the final position at the first 
stage of the analysis for those entities who do adopt the Model Articles in whole, it 
is not the final position for ostensibly bespoke articles: it is possible for a presenter 
to tick the ‘entirely bespoke’ articles box, but in fact append the Model Articles 
to the form. In such circumstances the Model Articles have, in fact, been adopted. 
Similarly, it is possible for a presenter to merely paraphrase the Model Articles, in 
which case the Model Articles have, in substance, been adopted. Accordingly, it is 
necessary to examine the content of the purported articles of association to establish 
not whether the Model Articles as a whole are adopted but whether specific articles 
adopted diverge from the Model Articles. We examined twelve potential variables 
within any articles of association. Our aim was purely to establish whether market 
participants are using the default regime across these twelve variables, avoiding Lele 
and Siems’ critique of La Porta et al extrapolating from their variables more funda-
mental conclusions that are not shown by the variables used. We have further seen 
that functionality is a key element of leximetrics. This concept is generally applied 
to legal systems in comparative leximetrics when it comes to identifying the correct 
82 Companies Act 2006 (Commencement No. 8, Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2008 
(2008/2860), Art. 5; Hardman (2020a).
83 Companies Act 2006, s. 4.
84 Companies Act 2006, s. 5.
85 Companies Act 2006, s. 3.
80 Companies House 2006, s. 14 and s. 16.
81 The Registrar’s Rules 2009, vol. 2, Sch. 2 issued under Companies Act 2006, s. 117.
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variables,86 but the principles can equally be applied to the concept of coding when 
testing deviation.
Initial leximetric studies used a ‘binary’ coding system (i.e., assigning laws with 
either 0 or 1).87 More recent leximetric studies have introduced a system of ‘non-
binary’ coding to encapsulate more of the complicated nature of the issues being 
discussed.88 It has been stated that ‘non-binary coding can lead to more meaningful 
results’.89 However, it can also lead to confusion as it increases complexity. If mul-
tiple numbers or fractions are used, then avoidable value judgements are introduced 
as to the differences between the variables—when averaging over larger datasets, 
using fractions implies set distances between the fractions. For example, it is tempt-
ing to measure full compliance with a default regime at ‘0’, full deviation from the 
default regime as a ‘1’, and a ‘partial’ deviation at a ‘0.5’. However, this approach 
risks misleading results as not every partial deviation would be exactly halfway 
between full convergence and full deviation. A more qualitative figure allocated to 
the degree of deviation could allow the coder to ascribe a value to partial devia-
tion in 0.1 increments which would reduce this problem. However, it would add an 
unnecessary level of subjectivity (and therefore make the results less verifiable) and 
was avoided.
Similarly, it was tempting to create added complexity by ascribing positive and 
negative numbers. For example, it is easy to imagine coding compliance with a 
default rule as ‘0’, deviation in a ‘shareholder friendly’ way as ‘+1’ and deviation 
in a ‘director friendly’ way as ‘−1’. However, this results in the figures cancelling 
each other out on aggregation: a sample of 100 companies in which 50 diverged in 
a ‘shareholder friendly’ way, and 50 in a ‘director friendly’ way, would produce an 
average score of 0, which implies pure convergence to the default rule instead of the 
full deviation that is actually seen. Accordingly, such an approach would complicate 
a simple overview of the Sample.
In order to avoid these complications, we use leximetrics merely to establish 
whether the market has moved away from the default regime in the UK. We there-
fore establish, for each of the variables identified, whether functionally the constitu-
tion of the company in question converges with the default regime or not. If it does 
converge, it receives a ‘0’ and if it diverges it receives a ‘1’. This enables us to estab-
lish which companies have functionally diverged from the default position for each 
of the variables. In other words, our study is deliberately limited to using the crudest 
form of leximetrics to establish quantitatively whether there is any deviation from 
the default regime across twelve variables only.
What, then, constitute our twelve variables and how are they coded?
86 Lele and Siems (2007).
87 La Porta et al. (1998); La Porta et al. (1997).
88 For example, use of fractions in Siems (2008b).
89 Esser, MacNeil and Chalaczkiewicz (2018).
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3.3.1  Weighted Voting
Whilst the default position is that shares have equal number of votes,90 it has long 
been acknowledged that articles can provide for weighted voting. Whilst ‘one vote 
one share’ voting is generally considered optimal,91 there are many reasons to devi-
ate from this model for private companies, from incentivising managers to provid-
ing strong institutional shareholders with more powerful blocking rights to reflect 
their importance.92 This can either be a constant variation in voting,93 or to provide 
additional rights to certain shareholders in certain circumstances. The former will be 
the case if, for example, every A share provides its holder with one vote per share 
and every B share provides its holder with two votes per share.94 The latter will be 
the case if, as in the classic case of Bushell v. Faith, shares usually attract one vote 
per share but on a vote to remove a director the shares held by that director attract 
three votes per share.95 For these purposes we will, of course, exclude the usual dif-
ferences between the weight of voting on a show of hands96 and the weight of voting 
on a poll.97 Accordingly, our first variable is whether the articles in question adopt 
weighted voting or not. The Model Articles contain no weighted voting. Accord-
ingly, articles without weighted voting are coded ‘0’ and articles with weighted vot-
ing are coded ‘1’.
3.3.2  Entrenchment
The Companies Act 2006 enabled any article of association to be ‘entrenched’.98 An 
entrenched article is one that subverts the usual rule that the articles can be amended 
by way of special resolution.99 An entrenched article can be ‘amended or repealed 
only if conditions are met, or procedures are complied with, that are more restrictive 
than those applicable in the case of a special resolution’.100 Accordingly, an article 
would be entrenched if it provides that it can only be amended with the agreement of 
85% of the shareholders. Entrenched articles can either be included on formation101 
or inserted by way of unanimous resolution.102 Our second variable is whether the 
articles in question have any articles entrenched or not. The Model Articles contain 
93 See Sect. 3.3.3 below.
94 As a result, those falling into the first category experience a strong cross over with the Class Rights 
metric.
95 Bushell v. Faith [1970] AC 1099.
96 One per shareholder—See Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 15-75.
97 One per share—Companies Act 2006, s. 322.
98 Companies Act 2006, s. 22; Cheung (2008).
99 Companies Act 2006, s. 21(1).
100 Companies Act 2006, s. 22(1).
101 Companies Act 2006, s. 22(2)(a).
102 Companies Act 2006, s. 22(2)(b).
90 Companies Act 2006, s. 284.
91 See La Porta et al. (1997); La porta et al. (1998).
92 See Huang (2017); Milman (2017).
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no entrenched provisions. Accordingly, articles without entrenched articles are 
coded ‘0’ and articles with entrenched articles are coded ‘1’.
3.3.3  Class Rights
The default position in the UK is that shares are all equal unless the articles of 
association provide otherwise.103 If they do provide otherwise, then the shares are 
divided into categories which reflect the various rights attached to shares, known 
as share classes.104 The presence of a class right provides additional protections to 
the holders of such shares: it protects the subject matter of the right from amend-
ment by those not in that class. Thus if articles provide that a certain class of shares 
have a right to have a multiple of the votes able to be cast by other classes, such 
right is protected until the beneficiaries agree to its alteration, providing a protec-
tion for the minority who hold that class.105 Thus law holds that class rights can 
only be amended by the agreement of the majority of holders of that class,106 and in 
votes as to variations of class rights subvert the usual rules that every shareholder 
can vote in their own interest107 with a rule that, on votes as to variations of class 
rights, a shareholder must vote in the interests of that class.108 Our third variable 
is whether the articles of association contain class rights. Article 22 of the Model 
Articles provides:
Subject to the articles, but without prejudice to the rights attached to any exist-
ing share, the company may issue shares with such rights or restrictions as 
may be determined by ordinary resolution.109
Accordingly, coding of class rights involves two linked but technically separate 
concepts. Firstly, the Model Articles contain no embedded class rights. Secondly, 
their procedure for creating new shares with differing class rights is by way of the 
passing of an ordinary resolution by their shareholders. Accordingly, if the articles 
adopt both of these provisions then they are coded ‘0’. If they contain either shares 
with embedded class rights, or provide for a different procedure to create class rights 
(for example, by way of resolution of the directors) then they are coded ‘1’. It is 
tempting to separate these two elements, however both are integral to the class right 
regime operating with articles of association of any particular company and there-
fore are so heavily interlinked that it is necessary to conflate them. It should be noted 
that coding will only determine whether the articles of association contain embed-
ded class rights, not whether different classes of shares have different rights (which 
103 Birch v. Cropper (1889) 14 Appeal Cases 525.
104 See Morse et al. (2019), paras. 6.023–6.040.
105 See Polak (1986).
106 Unless the articles provide differently—Companies Act 2006, s. 630.
107 North-West Transportation Co v. Beatty (1887) 12 Appeal Cases 589.
108 Re Holders Investment Trust [1971] 1 WLR 583.
109 Model Articles, Art. 22.
 J. Hardman 
123
could be determined by reviewing the resolution constituting such class and never 
be included in the articles).
3.3.4  Powers of Directors
In the UK, the powers of directors are a matter of construction of the articles of 
association.110 Thus attempts of shareholders to undermine the rights that directors 
have according to the articles of association have been met with short shrift.111 The 
reliance on interpretation of articles of association to establish division of powers 
means that it is impossible to:
make general statements about the typical division of authority between share-
holders and the board and management, because that is, in the main, open to 
be tailored to suit the individual company in question,112
but generally, articles of association provide wide powers to the board.113 Our 
fourth variable is whether the directors have unlimited power to undertake all activ-
ities that the company can make. It is important to note that this is a separate vari-
able to whether or not the company can undertake any particular types of activity,114 
this variable is instead concerned with who is authorised to undertake such activity 
on behalf of the company. Article 3 of the Model Articles provides:
Subject to the articles, the directors are responsible for the management of the 
company’s business, for which purpose they may exercise all the powers of the 
company.115
The main limitation on this is Article 4, which enables the shareholders to pass 
a special resolution to ‘direct the directors to take, or refrain from taking, specified 
action’.116 This power is limited to future directions and so cannot have retrospective 
effect.117 The rationale for such a wide power to the directors is that ‘the Govern-
ment believes that it is worth setting out in the articles the breadth of directors’ gen-
eral authority as agents of the company’.118
Once more, this provides a series of linked default rules: that directors have 
unlimited power where shareholders can, by special resolution, direct the directors 
to act in a certain way, and that any such direction cannot have retrospective effect. 
If the articles match this series of linked rules then they are coded ‘0’. Any variance 
from this is coded ‘1’, including:
112 Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 14–5.
113 Cheffins (2008), p 603.
114 For which please see Sect. 3.3.12.
115 Model Articles, Art. 3.
116 Model Articles, Art. 4(1).
117 Model Articles, Art. 4(2).
118 Department of Trade and Industry (2007), para. 3.46.
110 Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 14–3.
111 Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v. Shaw) [1935] 2 KB 113 at 134.
Articles of Association in UK Private Companies: An Empirical…
123
a. any embedded restriction on the powers of directors;
b. any ability to direct shareholders by a lesser or greater majority than special 
resolution; or
c. any ability for instructions to have retrospective effect.
Once more, it is tempting to split out these into separate variables, however as 
they work together to produce a single regime for the powers of directors, our con-
cern is purely whether this regime is followed in full or not.
3.3.5  Appointment of Directors
When it comes to the appointment of directors in the UK, the Companies Act 2006 
‘says little about the means of appointing the directors, leaving this to the articles 
of association’.119 In particular, ‘shareholders could be wholly written out of the 
appointment process’.120 Our fifth variable is therefore the methods for appointing 
directors. Model Article 17 provides:
Any person who is willing to act as a director, and is permitted by law to do so, 
may be appointed to be a director—
a. by ordinary resolution, or
b. by a decision of the directors.121
As with previous variables, the default rule could technically be broken into 
whether there is an ability for shareholders to appoint directors and an ability for 
directors to appoint directors. However, splitting the variable risks making the result 
less clear: if the variable was split into two, then an article which replaced the word 
‘or’ with the word ‘and’ above would be difficult to code. Again, we test the default 
regime for appointment of directors as a whole. The caveat at the start of this vari-
able is also important: any equivalent caveats about directors requiring to be willing, 
or being permitted by law to be directors (including related to their capacity (due to 
minority122 or otherwise)) are disregarded as variances on the grounds of the func-
tionality principle. Ability for shareholders to appoint directors by ordinary resolu-
tion or a decision of the directors appointing a director shall be coded with ‘0’, any 
variance from this (be it a requirement for a special resolution rather than ordinary, a 
limitation on either organ appointing directors or otherwise) are coded with ‘1’.
119 Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 14–23.
120 Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 14–48.
121 Model Articles, Art. 17.
122 E.g. Companies Act 2006, s. 157.
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3.3.6  Dismissal of Directors
Shareholders have a statutory right to remove a director of a UK company by ordi-
nary resolution at any time.123 This right is subject to special notice provisions124 
and cannot be achieved by written resolution.125 In addition, ‘the articles may 
provide additional grounds for the removal of directors, the most common being 
a request from fellow directors’.126 Davies and Worthington indicate127 that this 
may not be strictly required, on the grounds that the court has previously held that 
life directors can ask ordinary directors to resign,128 and have held that a major-
ity of directors have a right to ask a director to resign.129 However, in the absence 
of a clear provision in the articles the precise ambit of this right is unclear: will 
the courts include any requirement as to reasonableness on the other directors? Our 
sixth variable is, therefore, the circumstances in which a director can be made to 
resign by either directors or shareholders (and, in the latter case only, in addition to 
the statutory provisions).
Model Article 18 provides:
A person ceases to be a director as soon as—
a. that person ceases to be a director by virtue of any provision of the Com-
panies Act 2006 or is prohibited from being a director by law;
b. a bankruptcy order is made against that person;
c. a composition is made with that person’s creditors generally in satisfaction 
of that person’s debts;
d. a registered medical practitioner who is treating that person gives a written 
opinion to the company stating that that person has become physically or 
mentally incapable of acting as a director and may remain so for more than 
3 months; or
f. notification is received by the company from the director that the director 
is resigning from office, and such resignation has taken effect in accord-
ance with its terms.130
These provisions are all either automatic or in the control of the director whose 
termination is in question. Deferring to the functionality principle, the key coding 
issue is that a director ceases his or her termination by his or her own choice or auto-
matically due to a prescribed event. There is no ability in the Model Articles for the 
other directors to procure that removal nor for shareholders to do so in addition to 
128 Bersel Manufacturing Co Ltd v. Berry [1968] 2 All ER 552 HL.
129 Lee v. Chou Wen Hsien [1984] 1 WLR 1201.
130 Model Articles, Art. 18. Limb (e) was deleted by the Mental Health (Discrimination) Act 2013, s. 3.
123 Companies Act 2006, s. 168.
124 Companies Act 2006, s. 168(2).
125 Companies Act 2006, s. 288(2).
126 Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 14–49.
127 Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 14–49.
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the statutory right of shareholders to do so. Interestingly, when proposing the Model 
Articles, the UK government stated that it ‘has decided to include the notion of fail-
ure to attend meetings in the more general provision under which appointment ter-
minates when all the other directors decide that a director should be removed from 
office’.131 However, no such provision was ever actually included in the Model Arti-
cles. Accordingly, this variable is coded ‘0’ where termination events are either at 
the option of the outgoing director or automatic, and ‘1’ where other parties (be it 
shareholders, other directors or third parties) have the ability to require a director to 
resign.
3.3.7  Restrictions on Share Transfers
Unless shares in UK companies are held in uncertificated form in CREST,132 in 
order to transfer them a form which can be stamped must be duly signed and then 
stamped.133 Legal title, however, only passes when the transferee is entered into the 
register of members as holder of the shares, which has to be undertaken by the com-
pany. The result is a regime which provides: ‘a closed company [with] the oppor-
tunity to control the process of transfer of shares to new holders’.134 The power to 
refuse to transfer shares only arises if it is contained in the articles of association,135 
must be applied in the best interests of the company136 and, following implementa-
tion of the Companies Act 2006, requires directors to provide reasons for any refusal 
to transfer.137 Nonetheless, this only amounts to providing a rationale rather than any 
further substantive limitation on such power. Our seventh variable will therefore be 
the extent to which directors are able to refuse or delay the transfer of shares. Model 
Article 26 provides:
The directors may refuse to register the transfer of a share.138
Accordingly, the Model Articles provide directors the utmost discretion, without 
the boundaries of the law, to refuse to transfer shares. Absolute discretion by direc-
tors to refuse to transfer shares will therefore be coded ‘0’. Any inhibition on their 
discretion to refuse to transfer, including by way of a mandatory ‘permitted transfer’ 
mechanism under which the directors are obliged to accept certain transfers, or by 
way of a ‘prohibited transfer’ mechanism whereby there are certain categories of 
transfers which the directors are obliged to reject, is coded ‘1’.
131 Department of Trade and Industry (2007), para. 3.101.
132 Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/3755) and Morse et al. (2019), para. 6.502.
133 ‘Stamping’ involves paying a tax of 0.5% the value of the transferred shares to the UK tax authority, 
HMRC, at which time the relevant form is physically stamped to indicate such tax has been paid. See 
Stock Transfer Act 1963, s. 770(1).
134 See Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 27–5.
135 Morgan v. Morgan Insurance Brokers Ltd [1993] BCC 145.
136 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304.
137 Companies Act 2006, s. 771(2).
138 Model Articles, Art. 26.
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3.3.8  Ability of Directors to Authorise a Conflict of Interest
It has long been accepted in the UK that directors owe fiduciary duties to the com-
pany and are under an obligation to avoid having a conflict of interest with the com-
pany.139 This currently has a statutory form.140 The statutory form, however, allows 
a conflict of interest of one director to be authorised by another director ‘where the 
company is a private company and nothing in the company’s constitution invalidates 
such authorisation, by the matter being proposed to and authorised by the direc-
tors’.141 Our eighth variable is therefore whether anything in the company’s con-
stitution prevents the directors from authorising a conflict of interest by a director. 
This metric is, of course, to be differentiated from a subsequent ability for a con-
flicted director to count towards the quorum for a board meeting: articles of asso-
ciation may or may not provide for such ability, but that is a different question than 
whether, and only arises if, the directors are able to authorise the conflict in the first 
place.
The Model Articles do not prevent directors from authorising a conflict of inter-
ests of directors. Whilst they do provide that generally conflicted directors are not 
able to count towards the quorum, as noted above this is a different consideration to 
whether the directors are prevented by the articles from utilising their otherwise stat-
utory right to approve conflicts of interest by a director. The rationale the UK gov-
ernment has provided for this approach is that, as Parliament has decided a default 
rule in favour of allowing conflicts, it would be incorrect for the Model Articles 
to instead provide a default rule which provided the opposite.142 Accordingly if the 
articles are silent or expressly allow such then they are coded ‘0’ and if the articles 
prevent directors from authorising conflicts then they are coded ‘1’.
3.3.9  Authorised Share Capital
Prior to the implementation of the Companies Act 2006, there was a requirement 
for a UK company to state in its memorandum of association its maximum author-
ised share capital: the maximum amount of share capital that could be issued.143 
The company would only be able to have share capital issued which exceeded this 
amount with prior authorisation from shareholders.144 This is, of course, different 
from the amount of share capital of the company in issue from time to time. The 
result was that:
The company’s authorised capital might have been 10 million shares of £1 
each, but if only two of those shares had been issued, say at par, then its 
141 Companies Act 2006, s. 175(4)(b).
142 Department of Trade and Industry (2007), para. 3.76.
143 See Companies Act 1985, s. 2(5)(a).
144 Companies Act 1985, s. 121.
139 See Bray v. Ford [1896] AC 44, discussed in Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 16-52.
140 Companies Act 2006, s. 175(1).
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145 Davies and Worthington (2016), para. 11-12.
legal capital was £2. If anything, authorised capital served to confuse the 
potential investor.145
The Companies Act 2006 contains no provision requiring an authorised share 
capital, and therefore UK companies do not have to include one. In line with 
the general analysis adopted, however, they could do so if they wish. Authorised 
share capital has the potential to regulate relations between directors and share-
holders: it can be considered a cap on any general authority to allot shares pro-
vided to the directors from time to time. Our ninth variable is therefore whether 
the company’s articles of association contain an authorised share capital. It 
should be noted that this is different from any cap that the directors have in their 
authority to issue: authorised share capital is a more fundamental question of the 
amount of shares that a company can have in issue at any time without share-
holder consent rather than a limit on how many shares the directors are able to 
issue within a specific period.
The Model Articles do not include an authorised share capital. Accordingly, arti-
cles which are silent as to authorised share capital or expressly provide that there 
is no limitation to the maximum amount of share capital which can be in issue 
are coded ‘0’, and any limitation on the authorised share capital of a company are 
coded ‘1’.
3.3.10  Ability of Directors to Change the Name of the Company
Historically, the only way to voluntarily change a UK company’s name was by way of 
a shareholder resolution.146 The Companies Act 2006 retained this right147 and in addi-
tion brought in a new ability for a company to voluntarily change its name ‘by other 
means provided for by the company’s articles’.148 This could include allowing directors 
to change the name of the company. Our tenth variable is therefore whether the articles 
of association contain a right for directors to change the name of the company.
The Model Articles do not provide for the directors to be able to change the 
name of the company. Accordingly if articles are silent or a statement is included 
expressly preventing the directors from changing the name of the company then they 
are coded ‘0’ and if directors are expressly able to amend the name of the company 
then they are coded ‘1’.
3.3.11  Ability for Directors to Appoint Alternate Directors
It has been stated that in the UK ‘[t]he office of director is a personal responsibility 
and can only be discharged by the person holding that office, except to the extent that 
146 See Companies Act 1985, s. 28.
147 Companies Act 2006, s. 77(1)(a).
148 Companies Act 2006, s. 77(1)(b).
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the company’s articles make explicit provision. Many companies’ articles provide that, 
in certain circumstances, directors may appoint an alternate to act in their absence.’149
Ability to provide for alternate directors must be included in the company’s arti-
cles of association to be allowed. There is no automatic imputation of knowledge 
between the appointer and the alternate,150 and so an alternate’s ability to count 
towards a quorum will not be affected by a conflict of their appointer,151 but the 
alternate’s own conflicts will be relevant for the analysis.152 Our eleventh variable 
therefore is whether the directors are able to appoint alternates or not.
The Model Articles do not provide for the appointment of alternate directors. 
Interestingly, Table A did provide for the appointment of alternate directors under 
the pre-2006 act regime.153 The rationale for not including the ability to appoint 
alternates in the private articles was ‘the Government considers it unlikely that the 
directors of most private companies will want to appoint alternates’.154 Articles are 
therefore coded ‘0’ if they do not allow for the appointment of alternate directors 
and are coded ‘1’ if they do allow for the appointment of alternate directors, what-
ever restrictions are placed on such appointment.
3.3.12  Restriction on the Company’s Objects
Historically, UK companies had to have a statement of their objects, i.e. the action 
that the company could enter into and for what ends, in their memorandum of incor-
poration.155 Actions not within the company’s objects used to be outside the compe-
tence of the company.156 This led to considerable debate as to whether a particular 
provision was an object (i.e. something that the company should strive towards) or 
a power (i.e. the steps that were taken to achieve this).157 This began to change with 
the Companies Act 1989, which stated that:
the validity of an act done by a company shall not be called into question on 
the ground of lack of capacity by reason of anything in the company’s memo-
randum.158
This has been retained in the Companies Act 2006.159 Similarly, the Companies 
Act 2006 removed any requirement that a company state its objects.160 It did, how-
ever, leave the option open to a company: a company incorporated since 1 October 
153 See Companies (Table A to F) Regulations 1985, Arts. 65–69.
154 Department of Trade and Industry (2007), para. 3.107.
155 See Companies Act 1985, s. 2(1)(c).
156 Nyombi (2014).
157 Omar (2004).
158 Companies Act 1989, s. 108.
159 Companies Act 2006, s. 39.
160 Companies Act 2006, s. 31(1).
149 Morse et al. (2019), para. 8.211.
150 Re Associated Tool Industries Ltd (1963) 5 FLR 55.
151 Anaray Pty Ltd v. Sydney Futures Exchange Ltd (1988) 6 ACLC 271.
152 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v. Doyle & another [2001] WASC 187.
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161 Companies Act 2006, s. 31(1).
2009 is presumed to have unlimited objects if that company choses to include a 
restriction on objects in its articles of association.161 The shareholders of a company 
may wish to limit the objects of the company if the company is only meant to exist 
for, or undertake, a specific purpose. For example, if a company is only established 
to hold a specific property for investment purposes but only one shareholder is 
involved in management at all, then the corporate participants may wish to include a 
limitation of the objects of the company to doing so. Third parties are protected by a 
statutory provision:
in favour of a person dealing with a company in good faith, the power of the 
directors to bind the company, or authorise others to do so, is deemed to be 
free of any limitation under the company’s constitution.162
Even with this provision, shareholders are able to apply to the court to restrain 
the directors from acting in a manner which contradicts the articles of association of 
the company163 and directors can still be in breach of their duties if they breach the 
company’s constitution.164 Accordingly, any objects clause of the company remains 
relevant. The twelfth and final variable is, therefore, whether the articles of associa-
tion have a restriction on the objects of the company or not.
The Model Articles do not restrict the objects of the company. Accordingly, 
articles which do not restrict the objects of the company are coded ‘0’ and articles 
which do restrict the objects of the company are coded ‘1’.
3.3.13  Summary
A summary of the variables we have coded and the coding for each such variable is 
therefore provided in Table 1.
As noted above, a UK company’s constitution can be amended by the sharehold-
ers. Therefore, we need to code these variables for each constitution not only on 
incorporation of the company, but also for any amendment that may be subsequently 
made after incorporation.
4  Results
4.1  Results on Incorporation
4.1.1  Sample Overview
The Sample consists of 1417 companies. Details of the companies involved in the 
Sample, together with the coding of variables in line with the foregoing are included 
162 Companies Act 2006, s. 40(1).
163 Companies Act 2006, s. 40(4).
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in the dataset.165 The dataset contains company numbers, names, the details of types 
of articles included, and coding of the twelve variables. The documents on which the 
dataset is based were downloaded between January and March 2018, and reflect the 
constitutions of the Sample from the incorporation of each company in the Sample 
to 31 December 2017. The dataset is publicly available to enable readers to verify 
the outcomes outlined in this article with their own analysis to replicate the study. 
When we apply our exclusions from the Sample:
a. 8 were incorporated using forms from the Companies Act 1985 regime that must 
have been received from Companies House prior to 1 October 2009 but have only 
been processed after. Accordingly, they are incorporated on the 1985 Act’s terms 
and so are excluded;
b. 24 are not private limited companies and so are excluded (20 are companies lim-
ited by guarantee, 3 are public limited companies and 1 is an unlimited company); 
and
c. 291 company numbers were not listed as corresponding to UK companies at 
Companies House beta. The formal paid site, Companies House Direct, confirms 
that the majority of these companies were incorporated in October 2009 but had 
all been dissolved by June 2012. These companies are listed as having company 
name ‘None’ in the dataset. No further information in respect of these companies 
was publicly available for free when the documents in respect of the Sample were 
downloaded and they therefore are excluded on the grounds that no data in respect 
of them is publicly available for free.
Accordingly, the initial 1417 becomes 1094 companies in the Sample.
We have noted that, on incorporation, corporate participants have the ability 
to tick a box to apply the Model Articles wholesale, partially, or to adopt entirely 
bespoke articles. A summary of the boxed ticked across the Sample is contained in 
Table 2
This appears to demonstrate that the Sample indicates that the Model Articles are 
not efficient default rules. However, this demonstrates the risks of overinclusion in 
the leximetrics of divergence: simply because nearly 72% of incorporated compa-
nies purported not to adopt the Model Articles does not mean that they in fact did 
so, they may have included the same terms as the Model Articles (either identically 
or functionally). Even if this is not the case for the Model Articles in their entirety, 
it may be that not all variables are diverged from. Accordingly, in line with the gen-
eral approach taken on coding, we examined the 844 companies from the Sample 





4.1.2  Article Metrics
The coding of variables for the 1094 companies constituting the Sample on incorpo-
ration are outlined in the dataset and the results are as summarised in Table 3.
The ability to appoint alternate directors is the only variable which the majority 
of companies diverged from on incorporation. Interestingly, Table A did allow for 
appointment of alternates.
4.2  Results on Amendment
4.2.1  General
Of our Sample, only 63 (5.76%) ever changed their articles. This is a key insight 
as it implies that a UK private company’s constitution is not frequently amended. 
Table 2  Whether the sample indicated they adopted the model articles wholesale, in part, or excluded 
them
Box ticked in IN01 Number Percentage (%)
Option 1 (model articles adopted wholesale) 250 22.85
Option 2 (partially adopted model articles) 61 5.58
Option 3 (adopted entirely bespoke articles) 783 71.57
Total 1094 100
Table 3  Results of coding variables for the sample on incorporation
a Interestingly, this set of articles did not actually entrench any articles, merely ticked a box in the incor-
poration form which stated that an article was entrenched, without actually providing for an entrenched 
article.





Weighted voting 9 0.8
Entrenchment 1a < 0.1
Presence of class rights 22 2
Powers of directors 12 1
Appointment of directors 38 3.47
Dismissal of directors 38 3.47
Restrictions on transfer of shares 238 21.76
Authorisation of conflicts of interest by directors under s. 175 
of the Companies Act 2006
2 < 0.2
Authorised share capital 7 0.6
Ability for the directors to change the name of the company 176 16.1
Ability for directors to appoint alternates 628 57.4
Restriction of company objects 5 0.4
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Of these, 47 only made one change, 14 made a further change to their articles and 
2 companies changed their articles twice more. 25.4% of companies who changed 
their articles went on to change them again. This is considerably higher than the 
c5% of companies who initially changed their articles. This combination results in 
there being 81 changes to articles of association across the Sample, and shows that 
a company is more likely to change their articles if they have already changed them 
previously. Articles can be amended by way of a simple amendment to them or by 
wholesale replacing them with new articles. Of our 81 changes, 4 were amendments 
and a full 77 were restatements with new articles. The Sample group therefore indi-
cates that articles are more likely to be restated in full than merely amended.
Of the amendments, one introduced a new share class with weighted voting, two 
changed the transfer mechanics and one introduced an article to deal with beneficial 
ownership.
4.2.2  Results by Variable
Of the restated articles, the coding across the 77 is as outlined in the dataset and the 
results are as summarised in Table 4.
Other than an ability for the directors to change the name of the company and 
the false positive for entrenchment on incorporation, these percentage variations 
are higher than on incorporation. Whilst alternate directors also remain above 50%, 
over 50% of restated articles include change to the default on class rights (frequently 
embedded classes), removal of directors and share transfers.
This therefore shows that subsequent amendment is likely to be further divergent 
from the default rules than on incorporation. This matches the UK government’s 
aims for the Model Articles to meet the requirements of most companies, with those 
who care sufficiently able to change their own constitutions. This would also fit 
neatly with the Model Articles being designed for smaller companies as part of the 
‘think small first’ regime.
It is generally possible to code the amendment by any form of evident rationale 
for the changes. This is taken from comparing the coding for each relevant com-
pany’s new articles to the coding for their previous articles and examining the key 
changes, and is set out in Table 5.
Of our 81 sub-sample of the Sample which amended their articles, we can there-
fore remove the 23 that made no changes, to reduce the sample group for these pur-
poses to 58. Of that 58, 45 (consisting of the first three rows in Table 5 above, and 
77.59% of the revised Sample amendment group) appear to relate to a reaction to 
capital events in the company: introduction of a new share class either implies that a 
new share class has been, or is about to be, issued, and similarly the introduction of 
an ability for shareholders to override the activities of the directors implies that the 
company in question is joining a corporate group.
The low percentage of companies amending their articles, together with the high 
level of those amendments seeming to be linked to capital events, would seem to 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































directors, then across the twelve variables they meet the UK government’s aim of 
drafting the Model Articles on a majoritarian default basis.
4.3  Results on Presenters
Of particular note is the relevance of formation agents within the Sample. Com-
panies in the Sample were presented by 91 different formation agents. Presenters 
and coding are outlined in the dataset. Formation metrics or presenters are set out 
in Table 6.
This seems to present mixed evidence for Davies and Worthington’s suggestion 
that the presenter of a company may dictate its articles of association. Over 97% 
of the Sample used a presenter, implying that their use is prevalent. Of that num-
ber, 39 presenters only presented one company and it is therefore impossible to 
tell whether their articles were standard or bespoke. Once the ‘no presenters’ and 
the ‘only one presenters’ are removed from the sample, that leaves 1,025 com-
panies in the Sample. Of those, 49.56% showed no variance within the coding 
in respect of companies they presented and 50.44% showed a variance between 
them, implying that presenter choice was important but not the sole consideration 
in the choice of articles. Interestingly, however, the former is represented by 43 
presenters and the latter by 9, which seems to imply that there are more present-
ers (by number) who consistently apply the same articles, and yet the presenters 
Table 6  Formation agent
a Incredibly, the same typing mistake (a repetition of a clause heading instead of a new name being used) 
appears in all companies presented by 7 presenters, representing 76 companies (i.e. 6.9% of the total), 
and all 46 companies presented by one presenter (@UKPLC) contained the same footnote which appears 
to be accidentally left over from the tailoring process






Did not state that the company had a ‘presenter’ N/A 30 2.74
Presented only one company in the Sample 39 39 3.56
Presented more than one company with no vari-
ance as between the companies that they have 
presented: if one of their companies adopted 
Model Articles then all did, and similarly if 
all provided, for example, an ability for the 
directors to change the name of the company 
then all  dida
43 508 46.43
Presented more than one company with vari-
ance as between the companies that they have 
presented
9 517 47.26
Total 91 1094 99.99 (rounding 
error for final 
0.01%)
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who offer bespoke articles (or those who offer alternative versions of articles) are 
more commonly utilised within the market place.
Of the 9 presenters for whom there was a change as between the companies 
that they presented:
a. Jordans presented the most companies of the Sample (423 companies, or 38.67% 
of the sample total). Of these 423 companies, 402 (or 95.04%) were coded con-
sistently. Of those that diverged from this usual coding pattern, 16 varied from the 
usual Jordan’s approach to share transfers, 4 gave directors the ability to change 
the name and 1 included an extra element on director removal. Overall, even 
though Jordans did evidence some divergence, the vast majority of companies 
presented by them were consistent—and the main variance they have from the 
model articles is that they provide for alternate directors to be included in every 
single of their presented companies;
b. Cosun Formations presented 12 companies. 9 contained embedded share classes 
with specific transfer obligations (in particular, the same wording as to employee 
shares) and 3 did not. Other than this, they are in alignment;
c. Formations Direct presented 25 companies. 24 are in full alignment with each 
other and the 25th has articles in the same alignment, but ticked box ‘Option 1 
Private’ instead of Option 3. It appears as if this was by accident as the form IN01 
also attached this presenter’s usual articles;
d. First Corporate Law Services presented 29 companies, in which 3 have embedded 
multiple classes and 26 do not. 28 have variations from the model articles as to 
transfer, and 1 does not;
e. LtdOnline presented 14 companies, 8 of which are ‘Option 1’ companies, and the 
remaining 6 are split between 3 different forms of articles;
f. 7side Limited presented 5 companies in 2 different forms;
g. Burness LLP presented 3 companies in 2 different forms;
h. McGrigors LLP presented 3 companies in 2 different forms; and
i. Waterlow presented 3 companies which were all identical other than one company 
not including a limitation on the company’s objects.
In other words, even within the category of those presenters who presented dif-
ferent forms, the level of divergence from their standard forms is low. It seems as 
if Davies and Worthington’s suggestion that the presenters have their own forms is 
empirically verified within the Sample—and that choice of presenter may be a pri-
mary determinant of the constitution of a UK private company.
5  Implications and Further Study
5.1  Implications
The outcome of the empirical study has three key implications. Firstly, of the vari-
ables selected, the vast majority of companies in the Sample followed the variables 
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selected as set out in the Model Articles. Only the default position on alternate 
directors is not followed by a majority of the Sample on incorporation. Alternate 
directors were not provided for in the Model Articles for private companies as ‘the 
Government considers it unlikely that the directors of most private companies will 
want to appoint alternates’.166 This empirical study casts doubt upon whether that 
conclusion was correct, and provides evidence that alternates are sought after in the 
market by a majority of private companies.
Secondly, the level of subsequent amendment of articles within the Sample is 
low. This implies that companies do not frequently amend their articles of associa-
tion. Such amendments as there were appeared to be linked to specific capital events 
in the lifecycle of the company. Accordingly, the UK government seem to have been 
correct when adopting the idea that they should pick the Model Articles based on 
smaller companies, and more complex companies can adjust their own constitution, 
as necessary.
Thirdly, presenters of companies are frequently used within the Sample, and the 
presenter picked has a strong influence on the form of the articles of association that 
are picked. Of course, we cannot extrapolate causation from correlation: it could 
be that market participants pick the presenter based on the form of constitution that 
they deploy, or that each client of the presenter happened to have uniform needs. 
However, it is sufficient to note that presenters play a key role in establishing the 
corporate contract for private companies. Their use is currently suggested by the 
UK government, but it may be necessary for further scrutiny to be paid to the role 
of presenters in establishing the constitution of the UK private company.167 This is 
especially the case as the majority of companies do not change their articles of asso-
ciation post-incorporation, meaning that choices made by the presenters are likely to 
have long lasting implications. In addition, the reliance of UK company law on the 
articles of association places the constitution as a key element of company law more 
broadly. The impact of unregulated presenters on company law has been assumed by 
commentators. This study empirically indicates their importance: it may be time to 
pay more attention to them.
5.2  Critique
The foregoing implications, however, need to be considered with caution. There are 
a number of critiques which can be made of the study outlined in this article. We can 
provide responses to all such critiques, but it cannot be doubted that they do curtail 
how extrapolatable the outcomes of this study can be said to be.
Firstly, there could be issues of sample selection. Of course, the bigger the sam-
ple the more that can be drawn from it. We limited the Sample in two ways: by juris-
diction and by time. The former of these means that the outcome may be limited to 
167 The UK Government is currently proposing to verify the identity of those establishing companies, 
but this article verifies how important presenters are in the constitution of the company. See Department 
for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2020), paras. 123–129.
166 Department of Trade and Industry (2007), para. 3.107.
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168 Moore (2014), p 709; Grier (2014), pp 1–30; Bennett (2013), p 1. For an argument to the contrary, 
see Hardman (2021).
an insight into Scottish companies, without any wider application to the UK govern-
ance framework. Even if this is the case, however, this would be noteworthy. Whilst 
there are some differences in law between England and Scotland, company law 
generally is seen as being of uniform application between the two jurisdictions.168 
Accordingly, even if the results are limited in application to Scotland, and these are 
entirely different in England, this would be an important development in understand-
ing any differences in law and practice between England and Scotland.
The latter of the Sample limitations, limiting the Sample to the oldest companies 
under the Model Articles regime, can also be criticised. It provided the longest life of 
companies, and therefore gave the best insights into the likelihood of amendment of 
articles over the life of companies under the new regime. However, it does not show 
current market practice. We have also seen that our main divergence from the Model 
Articles, allowing for alternate directors, was included in the previous regime. There 
is therefore a chance that presenters were merely path dependent, rather than market 
participants particularly desiring the ability to have alternate directors. Whether it 
applies to legal reform169 or the activities of market participants,170 rules and struc-
tures which applied previously may continue to be applied even after their apparent 
removal. Margolis and Liebowitz provide 3 types of path dependence:
1. First degree path dependence arises where a decision has an element of ‘per-
sistence or durability’,171 in other words where a current decision is affected by 
previous decisions.
2. Second degree path dependence arises where imperfect knowledge of the future 
means that one makes a decision which subsequently turns out to have been the 
incorrect decision: they use the example of a decision to build a house at a site 
which has a sewerage plant built next to it 5 years later. At the time, this could 
not have been known, but a previous decision proves to have not been the correct 
decision and now it is too late for the economic actor to amend it.
3. Third degree path dependence arises where the economic actor has full informa-
tion but choses to make an incorrect decision: if they know that a sewerage plant 
will be built next to their plot but decide to build there anyway because their 
friends all live nearby.
For our purposes, the continued use of alternate directors could arise from any 
of the above three but seems most likely to be first degree or third degree: it may be 
that a presenter simply has no reason to delete alternate director provisions from pro 
forma articles (first degree), or it may be that the alternate director provisions are 
already in some articles with which company presenters are familiar and so decided 
to include them despite their lack of inclusion in the Model Articles (third degree). 
169 See Bell (2003).
170 Margolis and Liebowitz (1998).
171 Margolis and Liebowitz (1998), p 18.
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In any event, it is highly possible that the continued use of alternate directors arises 
from path dependence rather than a determined desire by market participants to 
include such provision for a particular new company in the abstract of any previous 
market practice. However, whether the cause is path dependence or a determined 
attempt by the market to allow for alternate directors, the research outlined in this 
article demonstrates that provisions in respect of alternate directors are included in 
articles of association. Whether path dependent or not, following the introduction of 
the Model Articles, newly incorporated companies used some provisions of the old 
regime and rarely changed their constitutions. It could also be that this path depend-
ence has faded over time, and that newer incorporated companies may not allow for 
alternate directors—this is worthy of further study.
Secondly, questions can be raised over the variables selected. It could be argued 
that they were not chosen in a systemic or holistic enough method. As a result, they 
may have missed some key elements of the Model Articles, or regular terms that 
are frequently added to the articles of association. Similarly, it could be argued 
that the study over-stated the importance of some variables: for example, appoint-
ment and removal of directors were listed as two variables, whereas it may have 
been more appropriate to merge them. It is submitted that the effect of this is mini-
mised: throughout we have been clear that the purpose of this research was only 
to see whether market participants were diverging on specific variables, rather than 
extrapolating this to a more general statement about the Model Articles as a whole.
Thirdly, issues could be raised in respect of the coding of the variables. It is noted 
in Sect. 3 that a number of different divergences would all count as a divergence. 
Accordingly, if faced with a significant divergence, further research would be neces-
sary to establish how the articles were diverging. However, this was not the case in 
any of the articles with multiple potentials for divergence, and so the rather crude 
binary leximetric coding is sufficient for out purposes.
Fourthly, it is questionable whether we can equate ‘what people are doing in 
the market’ with ‘what the ideal majoritarian default is’. In particular, all the fea-
tures that made default rules important may result in market participants being less 
keen to diverge from them. In addition to affecting the actual transaction required to 
achieve an efficient outcome, default rules can be ‘sticky’—courts may hold parties 
to higher standards to opt out of them.172 Similarly, it has been stated that the Coase 
Theorem ‘is not an empirical claim but is instead an analytic truth about what it 
means, under certain conditions, to act rationally’.173 Often, parties do not act ration-
ally in this sense.174 It has been empirically demonstrated that default allocation 
of rights can factor in the bargaining positions taken by parties: Knetsch gave one 
group of test subjects pens and plotted their willingness to trade them for dollars, 
172 Ayres (1999).
173 Coleman (1980), p 225.
174 Or rather, there are other ways that could be defined as acting rationally—see Cooter’s ‘Hobbes The-
orem’ whereby law is actively required to regulate bargaining to produce efficient results, Cooter (1982), 
pp 18–22. There is no other evidence that rational individuals will, ultimately, act in accordance with the 
Coase Theorem. See Regan (1972), p 431.
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175 Knetsch (1992).
176 Kelman (1979), p 679—although this effect is questioned: Spitzer and Hoffman (1980).
and another group dollars and plotted their willingness to trade them for pens. He 
found that whether you started with pens or dollars dictated on the type of transac-
tion you found acceptable for trade.175 In other words, it is not the case that (when 
swapping assets for each other) it is irrelevant who owns the asset in the first place.
Parties generally value amounts they have actually received more highly than 
they do opportunity cost income.176 Therefore parties may require more to sacrifice 
the benefits of default rules in their favour than they would pay for such benefits if 
the default rule were not in their favour. When negotiating a contract, each party’s 
bargaining aims will vary depending on the default allocation of rules. Psychologi-
cally, there is a big difference between a negotiation whereby each party wishes to 
introduce 5 (different and not-overlapping) contractual terms, and one where one 
party wishes to introduce 10 contractual terms whereas the other party does not 
require any but is relaxed about the changes that the other party wishes to make.177 
Accordingly, the selection of the Model Articles may influence what rules people 
select in the market.
Default rules apply unless opted out of, so are more likely to be utilised, so are 
more likely to appear in litigation, so parties are likely to have certainty as to their 
precise application. Conversely when bespoke drafting there is more possibility of 
an error—either in terms of meaning or accidental interaction with other default 
rules or express terms.178 There are also non-legal reasons for reticence to depart 
from default rules: too many deviations from the norm could mark the market par-
ticipant as inexperienced, more contentious to trade with or an ‘amateur’ who can 
be exploited—any of which can lead to the breakdown of discussions in respect of 
forming a company.179 Similarly, a party may not wish to displace default rules if to 
do so would result in them having to disclose adverse information to avoid a ‘price 
chip’—even if it risks a subsequent default.180 The full role for strategic bargaining 
is not yet fully analysed in the economic literature and default rules may play a big-
ger part than previously considered.181
These issues mean that all the factors that make default rules important enough 
to study also skew the market for that default rule. We cannot detect the effect of the 
default rule merely by observing it. As default rules always exist,182 we cannot ever 
verify whether a rule should be the majoritarian default rule using empirical analysis 
alone. In other words, we cannot say that just because market participants have not 
diverged from a particular variable that they definitively do not want to, and that had 
default rules been different then markets would have chosen differently. However, 
this does not matter for our purposes: the intention of this study was to establish 
177 For recent discussion of various psychological effects on bargaining, see Kohler (2013) and Kapakis, 
Volkeman and Lampaki (2017).
178 Goetz and Scott (1985).
179 Bernstein (1993).
180 Ayres and Gertner (1989), pp 99–100.
181 Johnston (1990).
182 Kennedy (1993), p 89.
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whether market participants are using the Model Articles or diverging from them. 
The majority of variables are converged to—the reason for such convergence is out-
side the scope of this study.
Accordingly, there are some critiques which can be raised of the study outlined in 
this article, but these can each be answered. LoPucki has stated that legal empirical 
research needs be less statistically precise than other social sciences, on the grounds 
that often hunches are being verified.183 On this basis, the results of this paper stand 
on their own. Siems identified empirical work as a natural extension for originality 
in modern legal analysis.184 This research does not purport to be definitive, but it has 
made a key extension into understanding certain variables of the Model Articles in 
practice, and a methodology for evaluating how default rules are actually used.
5.3  Further Study
The methodology and outcomes of this article demonstrate a number of natural 
extensions to this research. The first extension is to increase the coding of articles 
beyond the coding undertaken in this article. There are five key areas where this 
expansion could take place:
1. By number. Larger sample groups lead to more statistically significant results. 
Accordingly, a future development is to code more companies and thus establish 
whether the results shown in this research are correct for a wider sample group, or 
even for all companies incorporated under the rules contained in the Companies 
Act 2006.
2. By variable. It may be possible to undertake a thematic analysis of all corporate 
law governance defaults and establish all variables that exist in such governance. 
Thus, an extension of the research would be to expand the number of variables 
analysed and thus obtain a more holistic answer to the efficiency of the Model 
Articles, rather than our limited study into a number of variables.
3. By coding. Binary coding was adopted because of its simplicity and because, 
functionally, a provision either converges or diverges from each relevant vari-
able. However, a more complex coding system could be developed, to use those 
rejected in the design of this particular study, in particular either to include non-
binary variables (for example, under this research a partial convergence has to be 
starkly coded as a 0 or a 1, whereas including a 0.5 option may provide a richer 
result) or by coding on different spectrums rather than convergence: for example, 
constructing a scale as to whether a governance item is ‘shareholder friendly’ 
(coded, say, 1), ‘director friendly’ (coded, say, −1) or ‘neutral’ (coded, say, 0) and 
thus constructing a scale that did not measure convergence but instead measured 
the corporate actor in whose interests the particular articles fared.
184 Siems (2008a).
183 LoPucki (2018).
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4. By comparing across area and time. The sample groups measured companies 
incorporated within Scotland within specified time scales. It may therefore be 
the case that there is a lot of information to be gleaned by comparing regions 
against each other (does coding those incorporated with England and Wales or 
Northern Ireland for the same sample periods result in the same outcome?), and 
including a temporal aspect: do newer companies follow the same pattern? Does 
the time of year of incorporation make any difference? Does it increase or reduce 
any regional variances between them? Have regional differentials increased or 
decreased over time?
5. By more default rules. Articles of association are merely one source of default 
rules used within corporate law—it should be possible to examine other areas and 
other information (either publicly available or acquired by other primary methods 
such as surveys) to use quantitative leximetric methods to establish whether the 
default rule is correct or not.
The second extension is to expand the data leximetrically analysed. Companies 
House is a fascinating resource which is currently unexamined in legal study. Infor-
mation such as shareholder details,185 ‘person of significant control’ details,186 secu-
rity documents,187 insolvencies,188 number of directors189 and accounting reference 
dates190 are publicly available. Quantitative analysis of all of these can be under-
taken to establish relations between them.
The third extension is with the techniques applied to the raw data. As this article 
is a legal article rather than a statistical article, we have deliberately kept statistical 
elements as simple as possible. It may well be that utilising more sophisticated sta-
tistical techniques will result in more detailed results.
The fourth extension is to explore comparative analysis. This article has, of 
course, concentrated on UK private incorporated companies. There is analytical 
space to compare default rules between jurisdictions, in terms of both what rules 
are default rules, and what are not.191 Comparisons could then establish the extent to 
which any divergence can be compared between jurisdictions. This can further the 
analytical study of whether corporate law rules generally are converging,192 and the 
empirical approach taken to such matters.193
The analysis in the article involved establishing convergence or divergence from 
default rules established by the UK government. A fifth extension is to transcend 
185 Companies Act 2006, s. 853F.
186 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, s. 81.
187 Companies Act 2006, s. 859A.
188 E.g. Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1, para. 46.
189 Companies Act 2006, s. 167.
190 Companies Act 2006, s. 392.
191 For example, it is argued in the UK sphere that more rules are mandatory than are frequently 
acknowledged—Moore (2014); and there are differences in this regard between the UK and the US—
Coffee (1989), p 1620.
192 Hansmann and Kraakman (2000).
193 E.g. Siems and Cabrelli (2015).
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such default rules: there is no reason why the analysis cannot be expanded to estab-
lish whether documents produced by trade bodies as ‘market standard’ documents 
are, in fact, complied with. For example, the Loan Market Association (‘LMA’) 
is the market standard for producing documents evidencing debt arrangements.194 
LMA documents are a market standard starting point from which parties are free to 
commercially deviate.195 The empirical quantitative analysis deployed in this article 
can be extended beyond leximetrics to establish the likelihood that market partic-
ipants deviate from certain LMA provisions. Other variables (for example, quan-
tum of debt, extent of security, whether the finance is acquisition finance or not, the 
number of lenders) can also be coded to establish whether deviation from market 
standard is linked to any variables: and, in turn, whether it is correct to refer to a 
market standard or whether instead there are actually several markets. The extension 
of this methodology to over standard documents across markets is evident, with the 
only challenge being how to obtain from the market the actual documents that they 
are using.
A sixth extension of this research would be to move from corporate law default 
rules to default rules across a variety of legal disciplines. It may become possible to 
establish the degree to which market participants deviate from default rules across, 
for example, family law, employment law and contract law. Not only can the diver-
gence of individual default rules be tested, but wider comparisons can be drawn: 
does one category of legal analysis experience more or less divergence than another? 
This can then lead on to exploration of voluntary interactions more generally: it may 
be the case that there are fewer deviations from the default rules in, say, family law 
because of higher barriers to contracting. Empirical examination of wider default 
rules can help establish this.
6  Conclusion
The move to the Companies Act 2006 took place in the UK over 10 years ago. 
It seems as if the UK government mostly met its aim when it picked the Model 
Articles: the majority of companies in our Sample converged to the identified 
variables of the Model Articles on incorporation. The exception to this was the 
framework for alternate directors, which companies mostly included despite not 
being included in the Model Articles. The majority of companies did not update 
their articles of association following their incorporation. In addition, the role 
of presenters in incorporating private companies is considerable. This was pre-
viously suspected, but this study presents empirical evidence towards this. Any 
future analysis of incorporations or constitutions of private companies should 
consider these results.
The study does not claim to be a holistic for the Model Articles across all com-
panies, but does provide a clear result. This result is only applicable to the Sam-
ple, but it may be possible to extrapolate some of the outcomes of this study. More 
194 See http:// www. lma. eu. com/.
195 E.g. Saxton (2017); Johnson and Burgess (2017).
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importantly, this study provides a methodology that can be deployed in most situa-
tions. It also provides an empirical insight into an area for which there has been no 
current research.
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